A Theory of Trade Liberalization and Innovations with Heterogeneous Firms by Rutzer, Christian
 
 
 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ) der Universität Basel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Theory of Trade Liberalization and 
Innovations with Heterogeneous Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WWZ Discussion Paper 2014/02 Christian Rutzer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Corresponding Author: 
 
Christian Rutzer, Assistant 
Abteilung Aussenwirtschaft und Europäische Integration 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum der 
Universität Basel (WWZ) 
Peter Merian-Weg 6 
CH - 4002 Basel 
+41(0)61 267 33 00 
christian.rutzer@unibas.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  
 
 WWZ 2013 and the authors. Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs the 
permission of the authors. 
 
 
  
A Theory of Trade Liberalization and Innovations
with Heterogeneous Firms∗
Christian Rutzer∗∗
March 19, 2014
Abstract
This paper extends the ﬁrm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) by intro-
ducing a new concept of endogenous investments in process R&D. The novelty
is that if a ﬁrm invests more in R&D its expected innovation return hazard rate
stochastically dominates the return of less R&D investments. Due to this prop-
erty, entrants invest more in R&D in response to trade liberalization. As a result,
the aggregate productivity is aﬀected by a reallocation of resources to more pro-
ductive ﬁrms and a simultaneous increase in ﬁrms' investments in innovations,
which is consistent with empirical ﬁndings. At the same time the ﬁrms' increased
R&D investments lead to a sector distribution with a higher right-tail compared
to the distribution prior to trade liberalization. Hence, the model gives an ex-
planation for the empirically found diﬀerences in the distribution tails among
sectors with diﬀerent trade openness levels. Another advantage of this paper's
framework compared to other trade models with innovations is its foundation in
and extension of Melitz (2003). It enables most of the heterogeneous ﬁrms trade
models to be extended by endogenous ﬁrm-level R&D in an empirically relevant
and analytically tractable way.
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1 Introduction
A vast number of empirical evidence shows that trade liberalization increases the pro-
ductivity of sectors substantially. In general, this aggregate productivity gains can be
linked to a reallocation of resources towards more productive ﬁrms and productivity
growth within ﬁrms (Lileeva, 2008; Fernandes, 2007; Bernard et al., 2006; Treﬂer, 2004;
Pavcnik, 2002). One very important cause for the within ﬁrm productivity growth is
an increase in investments in innovations (Bustos, 2011; Lileeva and Treﬂer, 2010).1 In
addition, other studies ﬁnd that trade liberalization leads to more dispersion of ﬁrms'
productivity within a sector (Maggioni, 2013; Ito and Lechevalier, 2009; Syverson, 2004)
and systematically aﬀects the shape of a sector's ﬁrm productivity distribution (Okubo
and Tomiura, 2013; Sun and Zhang, 2012; Di Giovanni et al., 2011).
From a theoretical point of view, the reallocation channel has been widely analyzed
since the seminal heterogeneous ﬁrms trade framework by Melitz (2003). In these early
heterogeneous ﬁrms trade models that allow an analysis of aggregate eﬀects, ﬁrms can
only respond to trade liberalization by adapting their entry, exit or export decision
(Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003).2 As a result, the
sector productivity changes solely due to a reallocation of resources from lowly pro-
ductive exiting ﬁrms towards highly productive exporting ﬁrms. This selection leads
to a higher average productivity of a sector, because the productivity distribution is
now more truncated to the left. However, at odds with empirical results, the produc-
tivity dispersion within a sector decreases with trade openness. At the same time the
shape of a sector's productivity distribution is unaﬀected. Hence, the consideration of
both, within ﬁrm productivity change and ﬁrm selection seems to be crucial to match
empirical facts on how trade liberalization aﬀects aggregate productivity.
The aim of this paper is to provide a model consistent with above mentioned empirical
facts. In doing so it complements existing heterogeneous ﬁrms and innovation models
in two ways. From an economic perspective, trade liberalization leads to an increase
in industry productivity due to a reallocation of resources to more productive ﬁrms
and a simultaneous increase in ﬁrms' investments in innovations. To the best of the
author's knowledge, the increase of aggregate industry productivity that is attributable
to the combination of both, more innovation investments of ﬁrms and a selection eﬀect,
does not appear in any other theoretical model as yet. In addition, in accordance with
empirical ﬁndings mentioned above, the increased R&D investments of ﬁrms lead to
1Additionally, trade liberalization can aﬀect within ﬁrm productivity for example, by enabling a
better access of ﬁrms to intermediate inputs (Amiti and Konings, 2007) or through a better reallocation
of resources within ﬁrms for the purpose of product diversiﬁcation (Bernard et al., 2011). An overview
on what determines productivity in general is given in Syverson (2011). This survey also describes
diﬀerent channels on how trade liberalization inﬂuences productivity.
2For previous literature, see for example, Helpman (2006) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) or
more recent publications by Melitz and Redding (2012) and Melitz and Treﬂer (2012).
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more productivity dispersion and a higher right-tail of a sector's productivity distribu-
tion. Hence, the model delivers an explanation why trade liberalization can lead to an
increase in the productivity dispersion and a more right-skewed distribution of ﬁrms.
In a technical sense, it provides a simple and straight-forward extension of the well-
established Melitz (2003) model. The paper adds a pre-stage to Melitz (2003) with
Pareto-distributed ﬁrms in which a ﬁrm can decide on the size of process R&D in-
vestments.3 If a ﬁrm invests more in R&D, it draws its productivity from a Pareto
distribution that hazard rate stochastically dominates the Pareto distribution in case
of less R&D investments, i.e. the distributions diﬀer with respect to the shape param-
eter. This idea ﬁts well with empirical evidence on innovation returns in a long run
perspective (Leitner and Stehrer, 2011; Coad and Rao, 2008; Ebersberger et al., 2008;
Scherer and Harhoﬀ, 2000). They are highly uncertain and follow approximately a
Pareto-distribution. In addition, innovation returns have a higher right-tail in sectors
with high innovation activities like high-tech manufacturing or knowledge intensive
services (Marsili, 2005; Marsili and Salter, 2005).
In the model, these exogenously given Pareto distributions can be seen as the gen-
eral knowledge stock for the ﬁrms of an adapting industry. The general knowledge
is crucial because it determines the possibilities of subsequent applied R&D of such
ﬁrms. These investments in turn determine their productivity (Cohen, 2010; Cohen
and Levinthal, 1989). A more illustrative example on a practical level would be knowl-
edge in electrical engineering, which is, in principle, available to all ﬁrms within an
adapting industry, for example the car-industry. The applied innovations of ﬁrms
within the car-industry are limited beside other factors by the general knowledge in
electrical engineering.
According to the model, the R&D investments of each individual ﬁrm depend on the
aggregate level, which, in turn is inﬂuenced by all individual ﬁrm decisions taken to-
gether. This is similar to the industrial organization literature of free entry and R&D
(Sutton, 1996; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). Trade liberalization raises in the model
of this paper a ﬁrm's expected export proﬁts while at the same time lowering its
expected domestic proﬁts due to more import penetration. In contrast to other het-
erogeneous ﬁrms trade models and endogenous innovation (Long et al., 2011; Atkeson
and Burstein, 2010), the incentive of a single ﬁrm to invest more in R&D as trade costs
fall is not oﬀset by stronger competition. Hence, at some degree of trade openness, a
ﬁrm prefers to invest a higher amount of sunk costs in order to draw from a more fa-
vorable Pareto distribution. Other ﬁrms will behave symmetrically because they share
the same knowledge stock under the same conditions prior to their productivity draw.
3There are in general two types of proﬁt seeking R&D investments possible (Syverson, 2011). On
the on hand, investments in process R&D is conducted to make production of an output good more
eﬃcient. On the other hand, R&D investments in product innovations aim to invent a new product
or to increase the product quality.
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At the new equilibrium, it is more proﬁtable for each ﬁrm to invest more in R&D. As
a result, the aggregate level is now determined by a productivity distribution with a
higher right-tail compared to the distribution prior to trade liberalization.
At any given level of trade openness, this model simply is a Melitz (2003) model, but
with Pareto-distributed ﬁrms. The essential new feature here is, however, that the
equilibrium distribution, which deﬁnes the sector productivity, is now endogenously
determined by the R&D choice of ﬁrms. The choice, in turn, depends on the degree
of trade openness. This important and novel result is attributable to innovation out-
comes which diﬀer according to the hazard rate stochastic dominance criterion. If
R&D outcomes would only diﬀer due to the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance criterion,
the optimal R&D investment level of a ﬁrm does not change with trade liberalization.
An example is distinct Pareto distributions according to the minimum support.4
Much of the recent literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms is built around the Melitz (2003)
conventions and assumes productivity draws that are Pareto distributed. For this rea-
son, the R&D framework can be extended in various ways to gain new insights into the
eﬀects of trade liberalization at an industry level.5 Furthermore, the framework can be
used in calibration exercises to consider endogenous changes in the shape of the ﬁrm
distribution. This is important, because international trade systematically changes
the distribution of ﬁrm size, and inference that does not take that into account will
likely lead to biased estimates (Di Giovanni et al., 2011, p. 43).
This paper is part of the increasing literature on trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms and
endogenous process R&D investments. In particular, it focuses on the impact of trade
liberalization from a long term general equilibrium perspective. The model is there-
fore most closely associated with the work of Long et al. (2011). In their oligopoly
model with linear demand, entrants can also choose how much to invest in process
R&D before knowing their productivity. The beneﬁt of modeling ﬁrm heterogeneity
in an oligopolistic market structure rather than in a monopolistic competition market
structure is that trade liberalization leads to empirical relevant mark-up adjustments
(Bernard et al., 2012). However, in their model, the expected proﬁts of process inno-
vations after trade liberalization are exactly oﬀset by stronger competition caused by
ﬁrms entering the market. Hence, the innovation activity of a ﬁrm remains constant
for any level of trade openness in case of free entry. It follows that the aggregate eﬀects
of trade liberalization are identical to usual heterogeneous ﬁrms models and are solely
caused by the selection eﬀect.
4Pﬂüger and Suedekum (2013) and Bohnstedt et al. (2012) show that governments will increase
their R&D spending in response to trade liberalization in a model, in which increased R&D spend-
ing changes the technological potential summarized by the minimum support parameter of a Pareto
distribution. However, they do not focus on R&D investments of ﬁrms.
5The list of heterogeneous ﬁrms trade models with Pareto distributed ﬁrms is huge. Prominent
papers are, for example, Eaton et al. (2011); Baldwin and Nicoud (2008); Chaney (2008) and Helpman
et al. (2004).
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Atkeson and Burstein (2010) study the impact of trade liberalization in a dynamic
Melitz (2003) framework. In this model, ﬁrms can continuously decide on their R&D
intensity. One key result is that, independent of the degree of trade openness, high pro-
ductive export ﬁrms invest more in process R&D than low productive non-export ﬁrms.
Yet, in the long run, incentives of ﬁrms to increase their productivity enhancing mea-
sures in response to trade liberalization are again oﬀset by ﬁrm exit and entry. Hence,
aggregate measures only change because of the selection eﬀect. Moreover, they have
to rely on numerical methods to derive most of the results, whilst the present model
analyzes trade liberalization analytically.6 Vannoorenberghe (2009) suggests a further
model in which ﬁrms can decide on how much to innovate after resolving uncertainty
about productivity. In this extended Melitz (2003) model, trade liberalization may
lead to an increase in R&D investments by ﬁrms even under consideration of general
equilibrium eﬀects. Yet, the framework separately analyzes the investment intensity
at the ﬁrm level on the one hand and at the aggregate level on the other hand. Thus,
it is hardly possible to assess the impacts of trade liberalization on sector productivity
or welfare.
Other related papers, such as Unel (2013); Bustos (2011) and Navas-Ruiz and Da-
vide (2007) study the impact of trade liberalization on technology adaption in Melitz
(2003) style models.7 Their general result is that, in line with empirical evidence (Bus-
tos, 2011; Lileeva and Treﬂer, 2010), more productive exporting ﬁrms adapt to better
technology in response to trade liberalization, whereas less productive non-exporting
ﬁrms do not. Again, the aggregate productivity is aﬀected only by a selection eﬀect
because the shape of the underlying distribution does not change. Nevertheless, if the
possibility of technology adaption is considered, it is stronger than in ordinary Melitz
(2003) models.
There is one main diﬀerence between R&D as presented in the paper at hand and the
technology adaption models named above. In the present model, an increase in R&D
spending raises a ﬁrm's probability of realizing a higher productivity, but the exact
level remains undeﬁned. In the case of technology adaption models, however, a ﬁrm
knows exactly by how much its productivity will increase. This diﬀerence can be inter-
preted as a long term perspective chosen in this paper compared to a short/medium
term focus in technology adaption models. In the long run, ﬁrms may use entire new
production processes, which to develop exhibit high uncertainty. Meanwhile, from a
short/medium term perspective, ﬁrms may rather upgrade an already existing produc-
6Burstein and Melitz (2011) use a similar model to Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and study tran-
sition dynamics of trade liberalization. Another related paper is Costantini and Melitz (2007). They
also study transition dynamics of trade liberalization in combination with the timing of the innovation
decision.
7Ederington and McCalman (2008) or Yeaple (2005) also study how trade liberalization aﬀects
technology adaption. However, in their models, sector heterogeneity is a result of ﬁrms that adapt to
diﬀerent technologies and not the other way around.
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tion process.
Seen from a wider angle, the model relates also to the literature of endogenous growth
and trade liberalization. All previously mentioned studies have in common that they
focus on how trade liberalization aﬀects ﬁrms' investments in innovations or adoption to
an existing technology by taking the technology level or the general capability of ﬁrms
to apply R&D as exogenously given. In contrast, endogenous growth models generally
analyze, how trade liberalization aﬀects the economy's wide technological progress.8
Recently, several studies (Unel, 2010; Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2010; Baldwin and
Nicoud, 2008) have embedded the heterogeneous ﬁrms trade model of Melitz (2003)
into endogenous growth models à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Romer (1990).
These models analyze how trade liberalization aﬀects the knowledge accumulation in
the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms. In contrast to the model developed in this paper,
the decisions of ﬁrms are equivalent to conventional heterogeneous ﬁrms models. In all
of these models, a single ﬁrm takes the economy's wide knowledge as given and cannot
conduct any productivity enhancing investments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the model
by ﬁrst describing the R&D choice of an entrant and subsequently determining the
general equilibrium. Section three analyzes how trade liberalization changes the R&D
choice and how this aﬀects the aggregate level. Section four discusses some pros and
cons of the proposed R&D concept and its embedding into the literature. Section ﬁve
summarizes the main results.
2 The model
The main assumptions in our model are similar to those presented in the open economy
section of Melitz (2003) in the case of two symmetric countries and no dynamics.9 But
there are two signiﬁcant diﬀerences. First, entrants draw their productivity from an
explicit distribution, i.e. a Pareto distribution. This is, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion, standard in much of the literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms. Second, in contrast
to other heterogeneous ﬁrms models, an entrant can choose to draw from two distinct
Pareto distributions with respect to the parametric shape that these have. In the fol-
lowing, the word entrant will be used as the term for a ﬁrm before it has drawn its
productivity. The word ﬁrm will be used as the term for a ﬁrm after it has drawn its
productivity. The nominal wage rate serves as the numéraire and is set equal to one.
Melitz (2003) assumes standard CES consumer preferences and derives domestic proﬁts
8A review of the literature on trade and growth gives Segerstrom (2011).
9Melitz (2003) assumes an exogenous ﬁrm exit probability of δ. This exit rate is not needed and
will therefore be omitted from consideration.
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of a ﬁrm with productivity z as
pid(z) =
R
σ
(
Pz
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
− fd, (1)
where R denotes aggregate revenue, P the aggregate price index, σ the constant elas-
ticity of substitution between two consumed varieties, and fd the ﬁxed costs required
to remain in the domestic market. Only ﬁrms with a high enough productivity draw
to earn non-negative proﬁts remain in the market. The productivity at which a ﬁrm
has suﬃcient productivity to earn exactly zero proﬁts in the domestic market is im-
plicitly deﬁned as pid(zD) = 0. This threshold productivity value zD can be calculated
by setting (1) equal to zero as
zD =
(
fdσ
R
) 1
σ−1 σ
(σ − 1)P . (2)
In addition, a ﬁrm that exports has to pay ﬁxed costs fx and variable trade costs of
Iceberg type τ ≥ 1 per unit shipped. The export proﬁts of a ﬁrm with productivity z
can be written as
pix(z) =
R
σ
(
Pz
σ − 1
τσ
)σ−1
− fx. (3)
The export market threshold productivity zX is equivalent to the domestic market
threshold, deﬁned as pix(zX) = 0. Its value can be stated as a function of zD by using
(2) and (3):
zX =
zD
φ
, (4)
where some variables are merged to φ = 1
τ
(
fd
fx
) 1
σ−1
, with 0 ≤ φ ≤
(
fd
fx
) 1
σ−1
. This
expression can be interpreted as a measure of trade openness, where autarky would be
φ = 0 and free trade τ = 1→ φ =
(
fd
fx
) 1
σ−1
. As in the standard model of Melitz (2003),
only the most productive ﬁrms export. The formal requirement for this is zX > zD.
This is fulﬁlled as soon as fxτ
σ−1 > fd. In addition, because of additive ﬁxed costs and
market independent sunk R&D costs, all ﬁrms that export also sell in the domestic
market.
An entrant can choose between two diﬀerent R&D investments determining the distri-
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bution from which to draw its productivity.10 Its densities are
fL(z|z ≥ z0) = θL z
θL
0
zθL+1
or fH(z|z ≥ z0) = θH z
θH
0
zθH+1
, (5)
with z0 as the minimum possible productivity draw. Both distributions diﬀer with
respect to the shape parameter θ, where θL > θH . This leads to diﬀerent right-tails as
it can be seen from ﬁgure 1. The distribution with the lower shape parameter value,
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Figure 1: Distribution of Innovation Returns for a low level and a high level of R&D Invest-
ments.
FH(z), hazard rate stochastically dominates (HRSD) the other distribution FL(z).
If one distribution HRSD another distribution, it means the probability to draw a
productivity above any given cut-oﬀ level is higher for the dominant distribution than
for the dominated distribution. In other words, survival is more likely if you draw from
the better distribution according to the HRSD criterion. Formally, a distribution
function FH(z) HRSD a distribution function FL(z), if for any possible productivity
draw z
fH(z)
1− FH(z) ≤
fL(z)
1− FL(z) (6)
is fulﬁlled.11 Instead of, a distribution ﬁrst order stochastically dominates (FOSD) an-
other distribution, if FL(z) > FH(z) for all possible z is fulﬁlled. Furthermore, HRSD
implies FOSD but not the other way around (for mathematical details see for example
10This is only for explanatory purposes. It is shown in the Appendix that the results do not change
if there are a larger number of R&D choices available to an entrant. Thus, the function comes closer
to a continuous optimization, which might be considered in future research.
11As later on discussed, the results of the model requires HRSD. In addition, the formal proof is
derived in the Appendix
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Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)).
Hence, for every possible productivity z ≥ z0, the probability to draw at least z is
higher under fH(z) than under fL(z). Furthermore, the dispersion of possible produc-
tivity draws is higher in the ﬁrst case, because they are more scattered to the right.
This implies that if an entrant is willing to invest more in R&D, by paying a higher
sunk investment cost FH > FL, it draws from the better distribution and gains a
higher expected productivity draw. From now on I refer in the case that an entrant
draws from the θH-distribution to a high value of R&D and in the case that it draws
from the θL-distribution to a low value of R&D.
Modeling R&D in such a way captures some essential characteristics highlighted in
the literature. R&D has an uncertain outcome. But if more resources are spent to
R&D, it will likely lead to better results (Cohen, 2010). In addition, empirical evi-
dence suggests that in a long term perspective returns to innovation investments are
highly skewed and follow approximately a Pareto distribution (Leitner and Stehrer,
2011; Coad and Rao, 2008; Ebersberger et al., 2008; Scherer and Harhoﬀ, 2000). Fur-
thermore, a higher amount of R&D expenditures seem to increase the right-skewness
of such returns (Marsili, 2005; Marsili and Salter, 2005).
A micro-founded explanation for these distributions can be delivered by using a dy-
namic model, in which R&D investments inﬂuence the change of a ﬁrm's performance
over time. The derivatives are available upon request for the particular case if each
ﬁrm's productivity changes continuously according to a Brownian Motion. A ﬁrm's long
term performance is in this case Pareto distributed.12 Furthermore, the shape param-
eter of the Pareto distribution depends on the expected growth rate of the Brownian
motion. A higher expected growth rate leads to a Pareto distribution with a lower
shape parameter. If now the expected growth rate depends on the size of R&D in-
vestments, such an R&D choice would lead in the long run to the same result as in
this paper. However, modeling R&D in such a way is more complex. That is why this
framework focuses on entrants drawing their productivity directly from exogenously
given distributions.
An entrant seeks to maximize its expected ﬁrm value with respect to the R&D choice:
V (zD, φ) = max
i
{Vi(zD, φ)}, (7)
where the superscript i ∈ {L,H} indicates the choice. The decision depends on the
general equilibrium value zD, which is exogenous from a ﬁrm's perspective, and on
the degree of trade openness φ. This max-argument function will from now on be
called the R&D choice function. The expected ﬁrm value prior to the draw is in both
12Impullitti et al. (2013) consider dynamic productivity changes according to a Brownian motion in
a Melitz (2003) framework. However, in their model ﬁrms cannot inﬂuence the drift of the Brownian
motion.
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cases equivalent to expected proﬁts from domestic and export sales minus the sunk
investment costs: Vi(zD) = pii(zD, φ)− Fi, with i = L,H.
If an entrant ﬁnds it optimal to invest in the θi-R&D, it will enter into the domestic
market if it has drawn a productivity larger than zD. The probability is P (z > zD) =(
z0
zD
)θi
. Hence, an entrant's output-weighted expected domestic market productivity
is
z˜i =
(∫ ∞
zD
zσ−1
θiz
θL
D
zθi+1
dz
)1/(σ−1)
→ B
1
σ−1
i zD, (8)
with Bi =
θi
θi−σ+1 > 1.
13 Furthermore, a ﬁrm with a productivity draw larger than zX
will also export its product. The probability for this is P (z > zX) =
(
z0
zX
)θL
. The
output-weighted expected export market productivity is
z˜Xi =
(∫ ∞
zX
zσ−1
θiz
θi
X
zθi+1
dz
)1/(σ−1)
→ B
1
σ−1
i zX . (9)
Using the domestic market cut-oﬀ (2) in the expected domestic market proﬁts equation
((1) together with (8)), as well as the export market cut-oﬀ (4) in the expected export-
market proﬁts equation ((3) together with (9)) and then multiplying both with the
corresponding probability of a successful entry, total expected proﬁts of an entrant can
be written as
pii(zD, φ) = (Bi − 1)(fd + fxφθi)
(
z0
zD
)θi
. (10)
2.1 Determination of the general equilibrium value
An entrant decides to enter into the market as long as its expected value is larger or
equal to zero. Furthermore, it chooses the value maximizing level of R&D. Hence, the
free entry condition can be written by using (7) and (10) as
(Bi − 1)(fd + fxφθi)z−θiD − Fi ≤ 0. (11)
It determines endogenously the general equilibrium value zD. Without loss of gener-
ality, the lowest possible productivity z0 is set to z0 = 1. In this case the value of zD
has to be at least one. This bounds the parameter values to (Bi− 1)(fd + fxφθi) ≥ Fi.
Otherwise no entry would take place at all. As long as the expected value for a R&D
investment possibility is larger than zero, more entry takes place. This lowers expected
13The appropriate density function of all ﬁrms that remain in the market equals the density of all
possible draws conditioned on successful draws: f(z|z ≥ zD) = f(z)P (z≥zD) =
θiz
θi
0
zθi+1
(
zD
z0
)θi
.
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proﬁts for each R&D choice due to an increase in the competition intensity summarized
by zD:
14
∂Vi(zD, φ)
∂zD
= −θi(Bi − 1)(fd + fxφθi)z−θi−1D < 0, (12)
until the maximal expected value out of the two R&D choices is zero. The expected
value of an entrant cannot be larger than zero in equilibrium. Figure 2 exemplify the
expected home ﬁrm value for each R&D investment in dependency of the home mar-
ket competition intensity zD. If the competition intensity would be z
S
D, the expected
proﬁts of both kinds of R&D are larger than zero. This cannot be an equilibrium.
More entry takes place. This let the competition intensity increase and the expected
proﬁts decline until the point zHD is reached. The expected proﬁts of a high level of
R&D investment is zero at this level of competition. But investments in a low level of
R&D still lead to a positive expected proﬁt. Hence, further entry of ﬁrms that have
invested in a low level of R&D takes place until the competition intensity is at zLD. At
this competition intensity no further entry takes place, because investments in a low
level of R&D leads to zero expected proﬁts and investments in a high level of R&D to
negative expected proﬁts.
 
Adjustment through less entry 
Adjustment through more entry  
 
Entry Value V 


 

 

               Degree of  Competition  
 
 
Entry Value high R&D 
Entry Value low R&D 
Figure 2: Determination of the equilibrium.
Hence, in contrast to heterogeneous ﬁrms models without endogenous ﬁrm level R&D,
14There is some debate whether the general equilibrium eﬀect works through the labor market
competition or through the product market competition. Potin (2009) shows that the selection eﬀect
zD is inﬂuenced by both channels. However, all channels are summarized by zD. Hence, only this
value is crucial when analyzing how a change in the general equilibrium aﬀects the expected proﬁts
of an entrant.
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the functional form of the free entry condition depends now on the size of R&D in-
vestments. The question is how to determine zD analytically. A single entrant is
atomistically small and takes the aggregate level summarized by zD as given. The
R&D choice of all ﬁrms together inﬂuence the aggregate level and the R&D choice
of each individual entrant depends on the aggregate level. A two-way dependency of
this kind is well known in the industrial organization literature of free entry and R&D,
as used, for example, in prominent works by Sutton (1996) or Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980).
In this model the general equilibrium value zD is determined in two steps. In the ﬁrst
step, zD is calculated for all possible R&D choices: one where all entrants draw from
θL; another one where all entrants draw from θH ; and a third one, where a fraction
of entrants draw from θH and the rest from θL. In the next step, the R&D choice of
a single entrant is analyzed for each possible general equilibrium value and in depen-
dency of trade openness. Since all entrants are similar prior to the productivity draw,
an equilibrium comes about if an entrant does not ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from its
R&D choice in the case where the general equilibrium value is determined by the same
R&D choice.
If all ﬁrms were to draw from the θL-distribution, the corresponding cut-oﬀ value would
be zD = z
L
D. If, instead, all ﬁrms were to draw from the θH-distribution, its value would
be zD = z
H
D . In both pure cases, the cut-oﬀ value is determined by the free-entry con-
dition (11), given as
ziD =
(
(Bi − 1)(fd + fxφθi)
Fi
) 1
θi
. (13)
If, instead, a fraction of 0 < λ < 1 of ﬁrms have drawn their productivity from the
θL-distribution and (1−λ) of ﬁrms from the θH-distribution, the cut-oﬀ value would be
zD = z
mix
D . In this case, the cut-oﬀ value is deﬁned implicitly by a linear combination
of each argument of (11) as
(1− λ)(BL(fd + fxφθL)(zmixD )−θL − FL) + λ(BH(fd + fxφθH )(zmixD )−θH − FH) = 0.
(14)
Since zmixD is a weighted sum of z
L
D and z
H
D , its value is, respectively lower (higher) than
the highest (lowest) possible cut-oﬀ value, which results if all ﬁrms would have drawn
from the same distribution, either from θL or θH :
min{ziD; zjD} < zmixD < max{ziD; zjD}, (15)
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as long as ziD 6= zjD with i, j ∈ {L,H} and i 6= j. Such a mixed equilibrium exists only,
if a single entrant ﬁnds it optimal to make a mixed choice:
(1− λ)VL(zmixD , φ) + λVH(zmixD ) ≥ max{VL(zmixD , φ), VH(zmixD , φ)}. (16)
But the left-hand side can never be larger than the right-hand side, because it is a linear
combination of both possible values of the right-hand side max-argument function. It
can only be that the left-hand side is equal to the right-hand side. This is the case,
if VL(z
mix
D , φ) = VH(z
mix
D , φ). However, in this case no equilibrium exists, because an
entrant is indiﬀerent between every possible mixed choice. It follows that no mixed
equilibrium exists, because one of the two pure R&D choices, either θL with λ = 0
or θH with λ = 1, dominates the mixed choice. Which pure choice dominates and
determines the equilibrium will depend on the degree of trade openness and will be
analyzed next.
2.2 Trade liberalization and R&D choice of entrants
As in Melitz (2003) and other models with no dynamic adjustments, the following
results are seen as a steady state comparison of diﬀerent trade openness levels. Figure
3 displays the results that will be derived in this section analytically. It shows each
R&D choice (7) as a function of trade openness φ. Trade liberalization is interpreted
as a reduction in variable trade costs τ , which is equivalent to a larger φ (see (4)). The
ﬁgure shows that entrants prefer low R&D investments at low levels of trade openness.
But as soon as trade becomes liberalized beyond φ∗, entrants ﬁnd it optimal to make
a high level of R&D investment. The formal analysis follows now. First, we assume
that all other entrants draw from the θL-distribution and hence the general equilibrium
value is zLD (see equation (13)). The R&D choice function of an entrant (7) is in this
case as follows:
V (zLD, φ) = max
{
0; (BH − 1)(fd + fxφθH )
(
FL
(BL − 1)(fd + fxφθL)
) θH
θL − FH
}
. (17)
The corresponding zD cut-oﬀ value (13), with i = L, was used in the entrant's proﬁt
function (10) to derive this expression. The ﬁrst argument represents the expected ﬁrm
value in the case that an entrant decides to draw from the θL-distribution. Its value
is zero due to free entry for any level of trade openness as long as all other entrants
draw also from the θL-distribution. However, if an entrant deviates and invest more in
R&D and draws its productivity out of the θH-distribution, its expected value will be
the second argument of equation (17), VH(z
L
D, φ). The second argument of the R&D
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Figure 3: R&D choice in dependency of trade openness φ.
choice function increases as trade is liberalized:
∂VH(z
L
D, φ)
∂φ
=
θH
(
FL
(BL−1)
) θH
θL (BHfdfx − fdfx)(φθH−1 − φθL−1)
(fd + fxφθL)
θH+θL
θH
> 0. (18)
The derivative is positive, because BH > 1, θH < θL as well as 0 < φ < 1 and thus
φθH > φθL . The incentive to invest in a high level of R&D and draw from the θH-
distribution increases. If an economy becomes more open, competition will rise in both
markets and lead to lower expected proﬁts (12); however, at the same time, expected
export proﬁts will increase.15 If entrants were to have no R&D choice, there would
be an adjustment of the mass of entrants until both eﬀects would cancel each other
out. This is the case in conventional heterogeneous ﬁrms models as presented, for
example, in Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The entrant value (11)
would remain zero owing to free entry at any level of trade openness. This can be seen
from (18) by setting θL = θH :
∂VH(z
L
D,φ)
∂φ
= 0.
In the present model, however, the relative proﬁtability of high to low levels of R&D
investment increases with a decline in trade costs. Due to (18), there exists a particular
level of trade openness at which VH(z
L
D, φ) = 0 if the sunk investment cost FH is not too
15The derivation of (10) with respect to trade openness is ∂Vi(zD,φ)∂φ = θi(Bi − 1)fxφθi−1z−θiD > 0
when the change in the competition intensity is not taken into account.
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high. Hence, an entrant can raise its expected overall proﬁts above zero by investing
in a high level of R&D, even if the general equilibrium eﬀects have been worked out,
once trade has been liberalized beyond a particular level of trade openness. Spoken
diﬀerently, the free entry condition is no longer fulﬁlled for investments in a high
level of R&D. Hence, the intensity of the competition is too weak in order to deter
potential entrants from investing in a high level of R&D and try to get into the market.
Other entrants will also take advantage of this possibility. As a result the competition
intensity will increase (equation (12)). This leads to a decrease of the expected proﬁts
for both kinds of R&D investments, until drawing from the θH-distribution will lead to
zero expected proﬁts, VH(zD, φ)− FH = 0. However, the competition intensity is now
too strong to have zero expected proﬁts by investing in a low level of R&D, zD > z
L
D
→ VL(zD, φ)− FL < 0.
Second, we assume now that all other entrants draw from the θH-distribution and hence
the general equilibrium value is zHD (see (13)). The R&D choice function of an entrant
(7) is in this case
V (zHD , φ) = max
{
0; (BL − 1)(fd + fxφθL)
(
FH
(BH − 1)(fd + fxφθH )
) θL
θH − FL
}
. (19)
Here, once again, the ﬁrm proﬁt function (10) as well as the corresponding cut-oﬀ value
(13) with i = H has been inserted in (7). The ﬁrst argument is zero due to free entry
as long as all other entrants draw also from the θH-distribution. Thus, an entrant will
deviate and draw from the θL-distribution instead of the θH-distribution, only if the
second argument is larger than zero. The deviation value depends negatively on the
degree of trade openness:
∂VL(z
H
D , φ)
∂φ
= −
θL
(
FH
(BH−1)
) θL
θH (BLfdfx − fdfx)(φθH−1 − φθL−1)
(fd + fxφθH )
θL+θH
θL
< 0. (20)
The inequality follows immediately from the minus. The relative proﬁtability of high
to low levels of R&D investment increases as trade becomes liberalized. This attracts
more entrants as it would be the case if entrants invest in a low level of R&D. Hence,
the competition intensity increases more if the free entry equilibrium is determined by
entrants investing in a high level of R&D than by entrants investing in a low level of
R&D. As a result, the positive direct eﬀect of lower trade costs on the expected value
of an entrant that decides to invest a low level of R&D is more than oﬀset by the
increased competition.
Now, it is possible to determine the optimal R&D choice of entrants. Since the in-
centive to invest in a high level of R&D increases monotonically (18) and, the incen-
tive to invest in a low level of R&D declines monotonically (20) as trade becomes
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more liberalized, maximal one intersection point between φ = 0 and φ = 1 exists at
which VL(z
H
D , φ) and VH(z
L
D, φ) are equal. An intersection point exists, if the condition
(fd+fxφ
θL)
(
FH
(BH−1)(fd+fxφθH )
) θL
θH < FL
BL−1 < fd
(
FH
(BH−1)fd
) θL
θH on the parameter values is
fulﬁlled. The derivation of it can be found in the Appendix. It states that entrants ﬁnd
it optimal under autarky to invest in a low level of R&D. In addition, from a certain
degree of trade openness on they ﬁnd it optimal to invest in a high level of R&D. In the
following, it is assumed that this intersection point deﬁned as φ∗ exists. It is shown in
the Appendix that at this level of trade openness the general equilibrium value zD has
the same value irrespective of whether all ﬁrms would draw from the θH-distribution
or the θL-distribution. Thus, z
H
D = z
L
D = z
mix
D at φ
∗ follows immediately, because zmixD
is a combination of both pure general equilibrium values (see (14)). Hence, at φ∗ an
entrant is indiﬀerent between drawing from one or the other distribution, because
VH(z
i
D, φ = φ
∗) = VL(ziD, φ = φ
∗). (21)
As a result, at φ∗ no equilibrium exists.16
For lower levels of trade liberalization, φ < φ∗, the unique stable choice is a low
level of R&D investment. Owing to the previously derived result that an entrant
makes no mixed choice as long as φ 6= φ∗, it is enough to analyze the behavior of
an entrant at each pure general equilibrium value. By using the derivatives (18)
and (20), it follows from (21) that VL(z
H
D , φ < φ
∗) > VH(zHD , φ < φ
∗) = 0 and
VL(z
L
D, φ < φ
∗) = 0 > VH(zLD, φ < φ
∗). A rational entrant will therefore never in-
vest in a high level of R&D and draw from the θH-distribution, because this choice
is strictly dominated by an investment in a low level of R&D. Since all entrants are
similar prior to the productivity draw, they will all behave the same way and choose
θL. This in turn determines the general equilibrium value as z
L
D.
If, instead, trade is liberalized beyond φ∗, it follows from (18), (20) and (21) that
VL(z
H
D , φ > φ
∗) < VH(zHD , φ > φ
∗) = 0 and VL(zLD, φ > φ
∗) = 0 < VH(zLD, φ > φ
∗).
Hence, for all openness levels larger than φ∗ an entrant ﬁnds it optimal to invest in
a high level of R&D and draw from the θH-distribution, because this choice strictly
dominates an investment in a low level of R&D.17 Hence, the unique stable equilibrium
will be a high level of R&D investment with zHD as the general equilibrium value.
16No pure equilibrium and no mixed equilibrium, where the entrants' choices are split between θL
and θH , exist.
17This argument still holds if trade becomes liberalized and incumbent ﬁrms are exposed to an
exogenous exit rate δ as in Melitz (2003). As soon as trade is liberalized beyond φ∗, an entrant ﬁnds it
optimal to invest in a high level of R&D for all possible competition intensities zD. In the beginning,
all incumbent ﬁrms would have invested in a low level of R&D. However, these ﬁrms are hit by the
shock δ. The new entrants will all invest in a high level of R&D. The competition intensity increases
step by step from zLD to z
H
D (see (15)) until all incumbent ﬁrms that have invested in a low level of
R&D have exited the market.
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To gain intuition for these results consider investors that ﬁnance entrants. Each in-
vestor is equipped with suﬃcient funds to ﬁnance a large number of entrants. Fur-
thermore, each entrant can choose from an unbounded pool of uncorrelated projects
of the two types described previously. In the absence of asymmetric information and
full enforceability of contracts, a proﬁt maximizing investor will ﬁnance only projects
with the highest expected return: max{Vi(zD,φ)−Fi
Fi
} (or equivalent max{pii(zD,φ)
Fi
}). This
expression is equivalent to Tobin's famous q, the ratio of expected market value to re-
placement cost (Tobin, 1969). Consistent with the literature, it tend in the model to
unity by free entry (see (11)).18 Investments in a high level of R&D leads for any
level of trade openness to a higher expected productivity draw and a higher expected
market value compared to low R&D investments. Hence, if an entrant has to decide
once between both investments without taking the investment costs into account, she
would always invest in a high level of R&D. But as long as access to the foreign market
is highly limited, an investment in a high level of R&D is not proﬁtable, because the
investment costs are too high relative to the expected sales opportunities. As a result,
an investor will for low levels of trade liberalization only ﬁnance entrants that decide
to carry out θL-projects and for high levels of trade liberalization only ﬁnance entrants
that innovate more and carry out θH-projects. Eventually, trade liberalization changes
the market structure fundamentally, which increases the pressure on each entrant to
conduct more innovations to be funded by investors.
2.3 Trade liberalization and sector productivity
In the next step it will be analyzed what impacts the previously derived changes in
R&D investments on ﬁrm level has on the sector productivity. The sector productivity
is at a particular level of trade openness similar to Melitz (2003) for Pareto-distributed
ﬁrms:
z˜i =
(
1
1 + piX
(z˜iD
σ−1 + piX(τ
−1z˜iX)
σ−1)
) 1
σ−1
, (22)
with piX as the share of export ﬁrms to all ﬁrms. The sector productivity is a weighted
average between the productivity used to produce domestic sales, z˜iD, and the pro-
ductivity used to produce exports, z˜iX , under consideration of the output shrinkage τ
that reﬂects trade costs. In the case of Pareto distributed productivities, the sector
productivity can be written by using (4), (8) and (9) as
z˜i =
(
1
1 + φθi
(Biz
i
D
σ−1 + τ 1−σφθi−σ+1BiziD
σ−1)
) 1
σ−1
, (23)
18If Tobin's q would be larger than one, more ﬁrms would enter. This increases the competition
intensity summarized by zD until q = 1.
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with ziD =
(
(Bi−1)(fd+fxφθi )
Fi
) 1
θi as the equilibrium competition intensity. It depends
now on the size of the R&D investments of entrants indicated by i, which depends on
the degree of trade openness. The model would reduce to Melitz (2003) with Pareto
distributed ﬁrms, if each entrant draws from the same distribution for any level of
trade openness. As previously derived, for low levels of trade openness, φ < φ∗, all
entrants invest in a low level of R&D and the equilibrium sector productivity is z˜L.
Furthermore, all entrants ﬁnd it optimal after trade liberalization to invest in a high
level of R&D and draw from a distribution that HRSD the pre-trade liberalization
preferred distribution. Figure 4 illustrates the diﬀerence between a model with and
with no endogenous R&D investments. In the case of endogenous innovations, trade
liberalization leads to a larger number of productive ﬁrms compared to a model without
endogenous R&D investments. The impact on sector productivity diﬀers according to
two eﬀects. First, the existents of more productive ﬁrms leads to a tougher competi-
tion. The tougher competition requires a higher productivity to survive. As a result
the selection is stronger, which leads to a higher sector productivity: zHD > z
′
D (eﬀect
(1a) vs. (1b) in Figure 4). This inequality follows immediately from the free entry
adjustment, (11) and (12), and the level of competition at φ∗, (21).
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Figure 4: The impact of trade liberalization on the productivity distribution of all ﬁrms:
(a) in a model without ﬁrm level R&D investments à la Melitz (2003); (b) in this model with
ﬁrm level R&D investments.
Second, if all entrants invest in a high level of R&D, the productivity distribution has
a higher right tail compared to the case of no R&D investments (eﬀect (2) in Figure
4). In equilibrium there are more highly productive ﬁrms. As a result, the domestic-
and export average productivity are larger compared to a model without R&D invest-
ments, z˜HD > z˜
′
D (8) and z˜
H
X > z˜
′
X (9) respectively, because BH > B. This would even
be the case if an increase of all entrants' R&D investments would have no impact on
the selection eﬀect, zHD = z
′
D. In addition, the share of export ﬁrms is also larger:
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pHX = φ
θH > p′X = φ
θ, due to θ > θH and 0 ≤ φ ≤
(
fd
fx
)1/(σ−1)
≤ 1.19 This means
more weight is now on exports inducing eﬃciency losses. But the increased number of
export ﬁrms, that are on average more productive than the average of all ﬁrms, more
than oﬀsets the eﬃciency losses: 1+τ
1−σφθH−σ+1
1+φθH
> 1+τ
1−σφθ−σ+1
1+φθ
.20 Thus, all eﬀects that
can be attributed to the increased R&D investments inﬂuence the sector productivity
positively. Hence, z˜H > z˜
′.
This is consistent with empirical evidence by Lileeva (2008); Bernard et al. (2006);
Treﬂer (2004); Pavcnik (2002): trade liberalization boosts the aggregate productivity
by a reallocation of resources from low productive exiting ﬁrms to high productive
exporting ﬁrms and by productivity growth within ﬁrms. One important cause for the
second eﬀect seems to be increased innovation investments of ﬁrms in response to trade
liberalization (Bustos, 2011; Lileeva and Treﬂer, 2010). In addition, other empirical
studies show that the level of trade openness aﬀects systematically the ﬁrm distribution
of sectors. In particular, more trade openness leads to more right-skewed sector distri-
butions (Okubo and Tomiura, 2013; Sun and Zhang, 2012; Di Giovanni et al., 2011).
Furthermore, Maggioni (2013); Ito and Lechevalier (2009); Syverson (2004) document,
at odds with previous heterogeneous ﬁrms models, trade liberalization increases the
productivity dispersion among ﬁrms within a sector. The model in this paper provides
an explanation for these evidence: trade liberalization triggers R&D investments of
ﬁrms. As a result, the shape of a sector's ﬁrm distribution changes fundamentally in
the long run.
3 Discussion and related literature
The following section ﬁrst discusses modeling issues of the proposed R&D choice mech-
anism. Second, it embeds the model within the literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms and
trade.
First of all it is notable that all other aggregate variables can be easily derived, be-
cause they are all solely determined by the cut-oﬀ productivity ziD (13) and the sector
productivity z˜i (23). Hence, it would be possible to analyze in a next step the eﬀects of
trade liberalization on welfare. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to analyze
trade-induced innovations as a further form of gain from trade. An overview of the
welfare gains of trade when ﬁrm heterogeneity is taken into account can be found, for
19The conditional probability in the case of a Pareto distribution is P (z ≥ zX |z ≥ zD) =
(
zD
zX
)θ
.
The probabilities in the text are derived by using (4) in this expression.
20The inequality can be written as 1 + φθ−σ+1τ1−σ + φθH + φθH+θ−σ+1τ1−σ < 1 + φθH−σ+1τ1−σ +
φθ + φθH+θ−σ+1τ1−σ → φθ(φ−σ+1τ1−σ − 1) < φθH (φ−σ+1τ1−σ − 1), because τ1−σφ−σ+1 ≥ 1 and
φθ < φθH .
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example, in Melitz and Treﬂer (2012).21 The main aim of the paper is rather to build
an analytically tractable general equilibrium framework, that is in important aspects
consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings and can be extended in a variety of ways.
Since numerous models assume ﬁrms to be Pareto-distributed, the R&D concept can
be easily implemented in a large number of models.22 This might be especially useful
in models quantifying aggregate eﬀects of trade liberalization in calibration exercises.
Most of these studies based on heterogeneous ﬁrms models assume Pareto distributed
ﬁrms and take the shape parameter as exogenously given. However, the results of
such analyses can be spurious if the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the shape of the
distribution is unconsidered (see for example Di Giovanni et al. (2011) for an empir-
ical validation of changes in the shape parameter as trade becomes liberalized). The
framework presented here oﬀers one mechanism how this shortcoming can be solved.
In addition, changes in the optimal R&D investment decision of ﬁrms in response
to trade liberalization requires innovation returns diﬀering according to the HRSD
criterion. The mathematical proof can be found in the Appendix.23 If the expected
outcome of a high level of R&D would only FOSD and not HRSD the outcome of
a low level of R&D, the optimal choice would be independent of the degree of trade
openness φ.
An example may illustrate this in the case of Pareto distributed ﬁrms. Assume a ﬁrm
can choose between two Pareto distributions diﬀering in the minimum support param-
eter: z0H and z0L, with z0H > z0L. Applying the above deﬁnition of HRSD (6), it
turns out that the better distribution does not HRDS the worse distribution, because
fH(z)
FH(z)
= θ
z
and fL(z)
FL(z)
= θ
z
. Hence, the optimal R&D choice will either be z0L or z0H for
any degree of trade openness, depending on the investment costs FL and FH . This can
be seen by investigating the R&D choice function of an entrant. It is
V (zLD, φ) = max
{
0;
zθ0H
FLz0L
− FH
}
if the general equilibrium value is determined by a low level of R&D. Or
V (zHD , φ) = max
{
zθ0L
FHz0H
− FL; 0
}
.
21There is an ongoing discussion about the welfare gains from trade of heterogeneous ﬁrms models
compared to homogenous ﬁrms models (Melitz and Redding, 2014; Arkolakis et al., 2012, 2008). The
inclusion of R&D investments, as proposed here, would cause the elasticity of welfare with respect to
variable trade costs to be interpreted as a function of the degree of trade openness. Hence, a welfare
analysis within the present framework could contribute to this discussion.
22Redding (2011) discusses why the Pareto distribution is widely used in the literature on hetero-
geneous ﬁrms.
23The proof is done for the general case. Hence, this result is not restricted to Pareto distributions.
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if the general equilibrium value is determined by a high level of R&D. Each time the
value is independent of φ.
However, the HRSD criterion (6) is fulﬁlled if the distributions of innovation returns
diﬀer with respect to the shape parameter: fH(z)
FH(z)
= θH
z
and fL(z)
FL(z)
= θL
z
→ fH(z)
FH(z)
< fL(z)
FL(z)
,
because θL > θH .
What is the intuition for these diﬀerent outcomes? Trade liberalization increases the
minimum productivity that is required for a ﬁrm to survive. In the case of HRSD, the
ex-ante relative survival rate of a high level to a low level of R&D investment increases
in the failure cut-oﬀ zD:
∂
FH (zD)
FL(zD)
∂zD
> 0. Why? Because disproportionately more draws
lead to a low productivity in the case of low R&D investments compared to high R&D
investments. This asymmetric outcome matters more, the higher a ﬁrm's productivity
has to be to survive. Hence, the relative proﬁtability of high to low R&D investments
increase with trade liberalization. In contrast, if the outcomes between two investment
possibilities diﬀer according to the FOSD criterion but not to the HRSD criterion, the
ex-ante relative survival rate remains unchanged in the failure cut-oﬀ zD:
∂
FH (zD)
FL(zD)
∂zD
= 0.
Hence, trade liberalization does not aﬀect the relative proﬁtability of two R&D invest-
ment alternatives.
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(e.g., Baldwin/Nicoud 2008) 
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Figure 5: Placing the model in its proper research context.
The next paragraph describes how the framework of this paper complements other het-
erogeneous ﬁrms and trade models. Figure 5 shows it in a schematic way. Models of
heterogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous growth (Unel, 2010; Gustafsson and Segerstrom,
2010; Baldwin and Nicoud, 2008) analyze how trade liberalization aﬀects the general
knowledge accumulation of an economy over time. In a technical way these models
endogenize the sunk cost F (t) that each entrant has to pay in Melitz (2003) in order
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to participate at the productivity draw. The cost depends on the units of knowledge
created in an innovation sector up to a date t. The creation of knowledge over time
depends on the degree of trade openness. Compared to the model at hand, such mod-
els do not consider endogenous R&D investments of ﬁrms in an adapting industry.
However, many researchers hypothesize that the evolution of general knowledge and
innovations of adapting industries are jointly determined in the long run (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994). Hence, a merge of both frameworks could help to understand
better the role of globalization and its impact on aggregate productivity in a long term
perspective. To build such a model seems possible, because both frameworks are based
on Melitz (2003) with Pareto distributed ﬁrms.
Other models add a post-stage to the Melitz (2003) framework in which ﬁrms can
adapt to a better technology after they got knowledge about their productivity (Unel,
2013; Bustos, 2011; Navas-Ruiz and Davide, 2007). If in these models a ﬁrm decides
to adapt to another technology, it knows the beneﬁts and costs. Hence, it can be seen
as a rather short/medium run perspective in which some ﬁrms of an industry response
to trade liberalization by miner changes of already existing production processes. Such
changes have negligible uncertainty. An advantage compared to the model at hand is
the heterogeneous responses of ﬁrms to trade liberalization in productivity enhancing
measures. In contrast, the model at hand focuses on how trade liberalization aﬀects
investments in innovations in a long term perspective, in which ﬁrms discover entire
new production processes. However, the assumption that entrants are identical previ-
ous to the productivity draw could be relaxed by several ways, e.g., by diﬀerent sets
of distributions from which entrants can draw their productivity. Probably the easiest
way would be to assume diﬀerent sunk costs among entrants for each type of R&D
investment.24 Entrants with lower sunk costs would in such a setting ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to invest at a lower degree of trade liberalization in a high level of R&D. The general
equilibrium value would then be determined by a mixed equilibrium. Nevertheless, the
qualitative results of trade liberalization on the aggregate sector level would not be
altered. In addition, a merge of the framework proposed here and technology adaption
models would be feasible. The model of Unel (2013), which assumes Pareto-distributed
ﬁrms, could serve as a point of reference. Such a combined framework would take into
account the dual role of R&D claimed by many researchers. R&D investments gener-
ate new innovations and at the same time develops the ability of ﬁrms to better adapt
to new technologies (Keller, 2004; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).
24Such a setting would require hidden information about the sunk investment costs of entrants or
capital that can only be invested in a speciﬁc type of entrant. Otherwise no investor would ﬁnance
an entrant that needs a higher amount of sunk investment costs to gain the same expected return.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new concept of ﬁrm innovations and trade liberalization
in a heterogeneous ﬁrms general equilibrium model. For this purpose, it has extended
the framework of Melitz (2003) by introducing endogenous investments in R&D. R&D
has been modeled as the discrete choice made by entrants to draw their productivity
from diﬀerent Pareto distributions (i.e., they diﬀer with respect to the shape parame-
ter). The research ﬁndings demonstrate that, in response to trade liberalization, ﬁrms
now choose to invest more in R&D and draw from a better Pareto distribution com-
pared to the distribution that was preferred prior to trade liberalization. This result
is attributable to investment returns diﬀering according to the hazard rate stochastic
dominance criterion. If instead investment returns would diﬀer only according to the
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance criterion, the optimal R&D decision of a ﬁrm would
be independent of the degree of trade openness. Thus, trade liberalization inﬂuences
the aggregate level through a reallocation of resources towards more productive ﬁrms
and, novel to the literature, at the same time by a higher right tail of the ﬁrm pro-
ductivity distribution. This is consistent with recent empirical work emphasizing both,
the signiﬁcance of reallocation of resources among ﬁrms and increased investments in
innovations, to explain the eﬀects of trade liberalization on sector productivity.
An advantage of this paper's model compared to other endogenous innovation trade
models is its implementation in a well established framework. In a technical sense,
it only makes one addition to the workhorse model of Melitz (2003) with Pareto dis-
tributed ﬁrms; yet with a remarkable eﬀect. It enables most heterogeneous ﬁrms trade
models to be extended in an analytically tractable way by introducing endogenous
ﬁrm-level R&D. In a closer context, this framework can be used as the basis to ana-
lyze how various aspects of industrial organization topics inﬂuence the long run R&D
decisions of ﬁrms as trade becomes liberalized, for example concerning diﬀerent de-
mand structures or organization issues of production. Furthermore, it can be used in
calibration studies analyzing the impact of trade liberalization to account for empiri-
cally relevant changes in the shape of a sector's ﬁrm distribution. In a larger context,
it can be used to consider innovations on the ﬁrm level in endogenous growth models
with heterogeneous ﬁrms à la Baldwin and Nicoud (2008). This could lead to a new
theory on how trade liberalization, progress in basic research, and subsequent applied
research of ﬁrms interact with each other.
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5 Appendix
N-diﬀerent R&D choices
The assumption that an entrant can only choose between two diﬀerent productivity
distributions will now be extended to a large number of distributions. Assume there are
N, with N ∈ N, diﬀerent distributions from which entrants can draw their productivity.
Each of them has another shape parameter θi = θ1; θ2; ...; θN , with θ1 > θ2 > ... > θN .
Hence, the distribution with θ1 is stochastically dominated by all other distributions,
and the distribution θN stochastically dominates all other distributions. Moreover, an
entrant that draws from a better distribution has to invest more in R&D than if it
were to draw from a worse distribution: F1 < F2 < ... < FN . An entrant draws from
the distribution that maximizes its expected proﬁts:
V (zD, φ) = max{Vi(zD, φ)}, where i ∈ {1, 2, .., N}. (24)
From (18) and (20) it follows that
∂Vi(z
j
D)
∂φ
=

... > 0 if i > j,
... < 0 if i < j,
... = 0 if i = j,
(25)
with j ∈ {1, 2..., N} and j 6= i. Trade liberalization causes a decrease (increase) in the
incentive to draw from a distribution that is stochastically dominated by (stochastically
dominates) the currently preferred one. At the same time, trade liberalization changes
the currently preferred distribution. Hence, further trade liberalization also changes
whether it becomes more attractive or less attractive to draw form a distribution. In
addition, from F1 < ... < FN it follows that
∂Vi(z
j
D)
∂Fi
< 0, (26)
∂Vi(z
j
D)
∂Fj
> 0. (27)
Hence, an entrant is indiﬀerent between a maximum of two R&D choices at a particular
level of trade openness φ∗. Due to free entry, the expected proﬁt for the optimal R&D
choice is zero at the particular trade openness level φ∗. At this particular level of trade
openness, all other possible R&D choices lead to a negative expected proﬁt. Due to
(25), a further decline in trade costs to φ∗ + , with  > 0, could raise the expected
proﬁt of another than at φ∗ optimal R&D choice above zero. In this case, entrants
ﬁnd it optimal to draw at φ∗ +  from another distribution than at φ∗. In addition,
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if investment costs in R&D rise proportionally more than the expected R&D gain,
∂2F
∂2θ
> ∂
2V
∂2θ
, and at autarky an entrant prefers to draw from the worst distribution,
V1(zD, φ = 0) − F1 > ... > VN(zD, φ = 0) − FN , and at free trade, prefers to draw
from the best distribution V1(zD, φ = 1) − F1 < ... < VN(zD, φ = 1) − FN , then trade
liberalization will constantly change the distribution towards being one from which
entrants prefer to draw.
Parameter conditions ensuring the existence of φ∗
Entrants ﬁnd it under autarky optimal to invest in a low level of R&D if VL(zD, φ =
0) ≥ 0 and VH(zD, φ = 0) < 0 are fulﬁlled. Due to free entry VL(zD, φ = 0) = 0 →
(BL − 1)fd − FLzθLD = 0. Solve it after zD and use it in VH(zD, φ = 0) leads to
(BH − 1)fd
(
FL
(BL − 1)fd
) θH
θL − FH < 0. (28)
If this inequality is fulﬁlled entrants ﬁnd it under autarky optimal to invest in a low
level of R&D. Furthermore, entrants ﬁnd it optimal to invest in a high level of R&D
at a certain degree of trade openness φ < φmax, with φmax =
(
fd
fx
) 1
σ−1 ≤ 1 since
τmin → 1, if VL(zD, φ) < 0 and VH(zD, φ) ≥ 0. Due to free entry VH(zD, φ) = 0 →
(BH − 1)(fd+ fxφθH )z−θHD −FH = 0. Solve it after zD and use it in VL(zD, φ) < 0 leads
to
(BL − 1)(fd + fxφθL)
(
FH
(BH − 1)(fd + fxφθH
) θL
θH − FL < 0. (29)
If the parameter values fulﬁll this condition, entrants ﬁnd it from a certain degree of
trade openness on optimal to invest in a high level of R&D. Merge (28) and (29)
together leads to
(fd + fxφ
θL)
(
FH
(BH − 1)(fd + fxφθH )
) θL
θH
<
FL
BL − 1 < fd
(
FH
(BH − 1)fd
) θL
θH
. (30)
This expression ensures that VH(z
L
D, φ) and VL(z
H
D , φ) crosses one time between φ = 0
and φmax.
The cut-oﬀ value at φ∗
Due to free entry, VH(z
H
D , φ) = 0 and VL(z
L
D, φ) = 0 have to be fulﬁlled for any level of
trade openness. Hence, this also holds at φ∗. In addition, an entrant is at φ∗ indiﬀerent
between drawing from θH or θL: VH(z
L
D, φ) = VL(z
H
D , φ). This leads to the following
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system of equations:
(BH − 1)(fd + fxφθH )zLD−θH − FH − (BL − 1)(fd + fxφθL)zHD−θL + FL = 0,
(BH − 1)(fd + fxφθH )zHD−θH − FH = 0,
(BL − 1)(fd + fxφθL)zLD−θL − FL = 0.
A solution is zHD = z
L
D. Because
∂VL(z
H
D )
∂φ
< 0 and
∂VH(z
L
D)
∂φ
> 0, there is at most one
solution. Therefore, the only solution to this system of equations is zHD = z
L
D. In
addition, zmixD is a weighted combination of z
H
D and z
L
D (see equation (13) and (14)).
Hence, at φ∗ it follows that zmixD = z
H
D = z
L
D.
Proof that in order to get endogenous R&D adjustments of ﬁrms
to trade liberalization, HRSD is required
For the following relations of stochastic orders see for example Shaked and Shanthiku-
mar (2007). HRSD implies FOSD but not the other way around. The productivity
distribution FH(z) HRSD the productivity distribution FL(z), FH(z) ≥hr FL(z), if
fh(z)
1− FH(z) ≤
fL(z)
1− FL(z) . (31)
In addition, HRSD implies
FH(z
′
D)
FH(zD)
≥ FL(z
′
D)
FL(zD)
(32)
for all z′D > zD, with F (·) ≡ 1−F (·). The productivity distribution FH(z) FOSD the
productivity distribution FL(z), FH(z) ≥st FL(z), if
FH(z) < FL(z). (33)
In addition, if FH(z) ≥st FL(z) but not FH(z) ≥hr FL(z), then
FH(z
′
D)
FH(zD)
=
FL(z
′
D)
FL(zD)
(34)
for all zD 6= z′D. Furthermore, HRDS implies
EH [y(z)|z > zD] > EL[y(z)|z > zD], (35)
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for any increasing function y(z). However, FOSD implies only
EH [y(z)] > EL[y(z)]. (36)
Now to the model. The total expected proﬁts net of sunk costs can be written for a
not closer speciﬁed distribution function Fi(z) as
F i(zD)
fd(
(∫∞
zD
zσ−1fi(z)dz
)1/(σ−1)
F i(zD)zD
− 1) + F i(zX)
F i(zD)
fx(
(∫∞
zX
zσ−1fi(z)dz
)1/(σ−1)
F i(zX)zX
− 1)
 ,
(37)
with Pi(z ≥ zD) = F i(zD) as the probability of a successful entry into the domestic
market and F i(zX)
F i(zD)
as the export probability conditioned on a successful domestic market
entry (see Melitz (2003) for a step by step derivation). This is equivalent to equation
(10) if Fi(z) follows a Pareto distribution. (37) can be rewritten as
F i(zD)
(
fd(Ei
[(
z
zD
)σ−1
|z > zD
]
− 1) + F i(zX)
F i(zD)
fx(Ei
[(
z
zX
)σ−1
|z > zX
]
− 1)
)
,
(38)
where Ei[·] is each corresponding conditional expectation value. Now we divide this
expression with i = H through i = L:
FH(zD)
(
fd(EH
[(
z
zD
)σ−1
|z > zD
]
− 1) + FH(zX)
FH(zD)
fx(EH
[(
z
zX
)σ−1
|z > zX
]
− 1)
)
FL(zD)
(
fd(EL
[(
z
zD
)σ−1
|z > zD
]
− 1) + FL(zX)
FL(zD)
fx(EL
[(
z
zX
)σ−1
|z > zX
]
− 1)
) .
(39)
Each particular cut-oﬀ value, zD and zX , has another value if trade openness changes,
say from φ to φ′. Hence, this expression is at φ′
FH(z
′
D)
(
fd(EH
[(
z
z′D
)σ−1
|z > z′D
]
− 1) + FH(z′X)
FH(z
′
D)
fx(EH
[(
z
z′X
)σ−1
|z > z′X
]
− 1)
)
FL(z′D)
(
fd(EL
[(
z
z′D
)σ−1
|z > z′D
]
− 1) + FL(z′X)
FL(z
′
D)
fx(EL
[(
z
z′X
)σ−1
|z > z′X
]
− 1)
) ,
(40)
with z′D 6= zD and z′X 6= zX . Now by using the above stated property for FOSD (34)
it is obvious that (39)=(40) if the distribution function FH(z) only FOSD and not
HRDS the distribution function FL(z). Since in this case EH [·] = EL[·] (see equation
(35) and (36)). In addition, the ﬁxed costs fd and fx have to be the same for both
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kinds of R&D. Hence, in the case of FOSD but not HRSD the proﬁtability of a
high level of R&D investments relative to a low level of R&D investments remains
constant for any degree of trade openness. However, in the case of HRSD it follows
that (39) 6=(40). As a result, in order that a ﬁrm's optimal R&D choice depends on the
degree of trade openness, the expected outcomes of diﬀerent R&D investments have
to diﬀer according to the HRSD criterion.
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